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Abstract
Previous simulation models have found positive eects of cognitive diversity on group performance, but
have not explored eects of diversity in demographics (e.g., gender, ethnicity). In this paper, we present an
agent-based model that captures two empirically supported hypotheses about how demographic diversity
can improve group performance. The results of our simulations suggest that, even when social identities
are not associated with distinctive task-related cognitive resources, demographic diversity can, in certain
circumstances, benet collective performance by counteracting two types of conformity that can arise in
homogeneous groups: those relating to group-based trust and those connected to normative expectations
towards in-groups.
1 Introduction
As many societies become increasingly diverse along social and ethnic lines, it is important to study the im-
pacts of diversity on group performance. A prominent line of research, pursued especially by philosophers of
science and computational social scientists, has been to employ agent-based models (ABMs) for studying di-
versity’s impact on collective performance in simulation settings (Hong and Page 2004; Weisberg and Muldoon
2009; Zollman 2010b). Despite dierences in approach, the notion of diversity is understood in essentially the
same way in these models, namely, in terms of the variety of cognitive repertoires – background knowledge,
problem-solving heuristics, decision rules, etc. – that group members bring to bear on the common task. Let
us use the term cognitive diversity in referring to diversity in this sense.
This line of research has been a fruitful one, and in some cases its results have been used to support prac-
tical or policy recommendations (Grim et al. 2019). Yet, when turning to simulation-based diversity research,
societal interest mainly pertains to the potential eects of increasing underrepresented groups or demographic
diversity. And, given their focus on diversity in a cognitive sense, current ABMs provide little direct evidence
about how demographic diversity might inuence group performance. Such an approach might be reason-
able if demographic diversity only stood to benet group performance by increasing cognitive diversity. And
indeed, this assumption is common in the elds of psychology, sociology, and organizational research (see
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Steel et al. 2019 for a review of the relevant literature). Demographic diversity can be epistemically benecial,
according to this view, only when it “correlates with or causes germane cognitive diversity” (Page 2017, 9).
A number of empirical researchers have questioned the dominant view, however. They have argued that,
at least in certain settings, demographic diversity can enhance group performance, even when its inuence is
not mediated by cognitive diversity (Bear and Woolley 2011; Phillips 2017). According to one proposal (Levine
et al. 2014; Phillips and Apfelbaum 2012), demographic diversity can be benecial because it counteracts cer-
tain detrimental group inuences that may plague homogeneous groups. For example, agents in homogeneous
groups tend to put too much trust in each other’s testimony, resulting in a lack of diligence in processing infor-
mation from social sources. Similarly, in homogeneous groups, agents may refrain from expressing dissenting
perspectives for the fear of disapproval from other group members, leading to an unwillingness to share novel
and productive ideas. While presenting intriguing possibilities about the benets of demographic diversity, a
thorough assessment of the hypotheses has been hampered by a variety of factors including relatively small
sample sizes, the diculty of completely decoupling demographic from cognitive diversity, as well as the com-
plications involved in assessing the longitudinal eects of increased diversity in a group of interacting agents,
where potential benets may be overwhelmed by obstacles such as conict and lack of trust.
In this article, by augmenting a model developed by Zollman (2010b), we construct a model for testing
two mechanisms suggested by the hypotheses that demographic diversity can positively impact group per-
formance, even in the absence of any correlation with cognitive diversity. In Section 2, we explain how the
hypothesized mechanisms are supposed to work, and why agent-based modeling is a useful tool for examin-
ing these hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the general set-up of the simulations. In Section 4, we examine
the rst hypothesis, according to which demographic diversity positively inuences group performance by
reducing the excessive mutual trust between group members. In Section 5, we examine the second hypothesis
that diversity epistemically benets the group by reducing the conformity pressure felt by group members.
The results of the two simulations lend support to the main claims of these hypotheses, but with important
qualications. We also provide a general discussion of the results in Section 6. In particular, we (1) highlight
some of the limitations of the model; (2) critically examine the uptake of the results of agent-based models
that do not represent demographic identity; and (3) provide a suggestion for the use of robustness analysis
in evaluating simulation studies that seek to provide empirical insight and practical guidance. Specically,
given that most social phenomena are highly context sensitive, we suggest that modeling results should not
be expected to be robust in general but only robust in ways that correspond to the empirical evidence.
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2 Benets of Diversity, Costs of Homogeneity
Understanding the benets of diversity requires appreciating the potential costs of homogeneity (Phillips and
Apfelbaum 2012). Chief among these costs is conformity. At a general level, conformity refers to a change in
belief or behavior in response to real or imagined pressures to resemble others (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004;
Gilovich et al. 2018). Seemingly similar conformist behaviors can arise for dierent reasons, however. A useful
initial distinction can be made between informational and normative social inuences (Deutsch and Gerard
1955).
Informational and normative inuences arise for distinct reasons, have dierent eect modiers, and im-
pact dierent aspects of an agent’s psychology. Informational inuences arise in conditions involving ambigu-
ous tasks and uncertain decision environments (see for example Sherif 1936). What drives conformity pressure
in response to these inuences is the need for others as sources of information about reality. Accordingly, the
strength of the resulting conformity pressure can be modulated by factors that impact the need for and reliance
on others as sources of information, such as the nature and diculty of the task, as well as the perceived ability
and expertise of others, compared to self (Crano 1970; Hogg and Abrams 1988). By inuencing the relative
reliability assigned to various informational sources, and so shaping the integration of information arriving
from these sources, such inuences predominantly impact belief formation. Hence, informational inuences
typically induce conformity in public behavior as well as private belief (Kelman 1958).
Normative social inuences, in contrast, depend on an individual’s desire to be liked by their group or at
least not be punished by them (Asch 1956; Gaither et al. 2018). This type of social inuence is typically accom-
panied by normative expectations regarding what other members of the group, whose approval or disapproval
one cares about, believe one ought to do (Bicchieri 2017). The strength of the resulting conformity pressure is
thus a function of the group’s real or perceived reward and punishment power as well as the extent to which
the agent is moved by this power, possibly as a result of the overall reward structure of the environment (e.g.,
the benet and cost of conformist versus nonconformist behavior in the situation) (Raven 2008). By shaping
the costs and rewards of pursuing dierent courses of action, the locus of normative social inuences is de-
liberation and decision making. As a result, with normative social inuences private acceptance and public
compliance can come apart (Gilovich et al. 2018); agents may act in agreement with the majority position
because of normative expectations, and despite their private beliefs.
The question of who counts as part of some individual’s social “group" depends on which type of inuence
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is under discussion. Insofar as informational inuences are concerned, a group member may be anyone whose
judgment is deemed by the agent to have a bearing about a task. In the case of normative inuences, on the
other hand, conformity depends on an individuals’ sense of belonging to a group whose approval and disap-
proval they care about. While in principle the sense of “groupiness" is predominantly implicated in normative
inuences, in practice matters are more complex. Specically, when an individual perceives in-group members
as more trustworthy sources of information about the world, group identication also determines who gets to
inuence the individual and to what extent. This is precisely what happens in referent informational inuence
(Turner 1982; Turner, Wetherell, and Hogg 1989). Here, members of the group with which the agent identies
are judged to be more competent and trustworthy and their views are taken to be more worthy of consider-
ation. In this way, judgments of trust and reliability stemming from group aliation also shape individuals’
belief revisions.
As a number of experiments have shown, normative and referent informational conformity are relevant
to the question of how demographic diversity might impact group performance (Gaither et al. 2018; Levine
et al. 2014; Phillips 2017; Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale 2009). These experiments are designed to break the
link between demographic and cognitive diversity, usually by testing group performance on contrived tasks
(e.g., solving a murder mystery or trading real estate in a ctional market) wherein relevant information can
be supplied exclusively by the experimenters and for which individual ability can be tested and statistically
controlled for. These researchers take their results to suggest that demographic diversity can improve perfor-
mance even when social identity is not associated with task-related information or other relevant cognitive
dierences (Levine et al. 2014; Phillips 2017). Two types of hypotheses emerge from this literature:
1. Counteracting referent informational group inuences. Individuals may put too much trust in so-
cially similar others, uncritically accepting others’ views and frequently re-considering their own view in
response to the majority position. By decreasing excessive trust in social sources, demographic diversity
can result in a more diligent assessment of information (Gaither et al. 2018; Levine et al. 2014).
2. Counteracting normative group inuences. Individuals in homogeneous groups may be reluctant to
voice dissenting opinions, perhaps as result of a normative expectation that people similar to themselves
ought to agree with one another. Demographic diversity can reduce this conformity pressure, allowing
groups to successfully elicit dissenting views that are valuable to the task (Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale
2009; Phillips and Loyd 2006).
Consider two experiments that illustrate these hypotheses. In the rst (Levine et al. 2014), experimental
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subjects traded real-estate in a ctional online market in ethnically diverse or homogeneous conditions. Par-
ticipants were provided with the information needed to assess the market value of the properties they were
trading, and their individual ability to accurately price properties was assessed prior to engaging in trade with
other participants. Before trading, participants sat in a room with their group-mates so that they could see
who they would be trading with. The primary ndings were that ethnically diverse groups were more likely
to price properties accurately and were less prone to bubbles than ethnically homogeneous groups of traders,
results that could not be explained by dierences of individual trading ability between groups. “Homogeneity,”
Levine et al. suggest, “imbues people with false condence in the judgment of coethnics, discouraging them
from scrutinizing behavior. In contrast, traders in diverse markets ... are less likely to accept inated oers
and more likely to accept oers that are closer to true value, thereby thwarting bubbles" (Levine et al. 2014).
In the second example we consider (Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale 2009), experimental subjects were pre-
sented with the task of nding the culprit in a murder mystery. Membership in a sorority or fraternity was
used as a marker for social identity. Participants read the case and indicated the most likely suspect before
being placed in groups. Each group consisted of three individuals from the same fraternity or sorority, dubbed
“oldtimers," who would have 5 minutes to discuss who the culprit was prior to the arrival of a newcomer, who
could either be an in-group or out-group individual. Groups were arranged so that the newcomer had 0, 1 or
2 “opinion allies" among the oldtimers who agreed with the newcomer about the most likely suspect. Thus,
the experiment was a 2 × 3 design: two types of newcomer (in-group or out-group) and three conditions (0,
1, or 2 opinion allies). For each condition, groups were more likely to correctly identify the culprit when the
newcomer was an out-group individual, although participants of groups with out-group newcomers reported
lower condence in their answers and perceived their groups’ interactions as less eective. Moreover, the
advantage for groups with out-group newcomers was enhanced signicantly when the newcomer had 1 or 2
opinion allies. Phillips et al. suggest that this eect is related to oldtimers paying greater attention to views
expressed by out-group than in-group newcomers. Prior work (Phillips and Loyd 2006) found that people
are more likely to be annoyed when dissenting views are expressed by members of their own identity group,
which could lead to paying greater attention to a dissenting view when it is expressed by an out-group person.
That in turn could explain why groups with out-group newcomers would perform better in the 0 opinion ally
condition. Phillips et al. suggest that the larger positive eect of out-group newcomers in the 1 and 2 opinion
ally conditions is due to the desire to maintain positive relationships with fellow in-group individuals. They
hypothesize that while agreement with an in-group newcomer is likely to be taken as merely conrming one’s
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views, nding oneself siding against a member of one’s own group by agreeing with an out-group individual
is likely to generate anxiety about damaging in-group ties. Phillips et al. suggest that social risks involved
in taking sides against one’s identity group may result in more careful attention to reasons that underlie the
dierences of views, and consequently to better results. In sum, Phillips et al.’s interpretation of their results
focuses on normative conformity: people tend to think that members of their own identity group should see
eye to eye, which can result in dismissing dissenting opinions when voiced by in-group newcomers or to a
heightened concern to probe disagreements when one is unexpectedly allied with an outsider against a member
of one’s own group.
But a variety of uncertainties confront the experiments such as those just described. The samples sizes
involved are typically rather small (rarely more than a few hundred people), and it is also dicult to ensure
that the connection between demographic and cognitive diversity has been completely severed. Regarding
the latter point, consider providing participants with relevant information and testing for individual ability
on the task, as in the Levine et al. experiment. Yet it is conceivable that diering social identities might be
statistically associated with distinct problem solving heuristics, and that a diversity of heuristics improves
group performance even if, at an individual level, one heuristic does not tend to do better than another (Hong
and Page 2004). Furthermore, some of the ndings pertain to the conformity-related impact of diversity on
individual cognition in the sense that, in some studies, other than a focal participant the rest of the group
is composed of confederates of the experimenters. This restricted setup means that the studies may neglect
the potentially harmful eects on group cognition that can arise as a result of dynamic interactions between
individual members. This is important because counteracting referent informational and normative conformity
is not without potential costs. With respect to referent informational inuences, diversity decreases trust
in others because of an unjustied view of out-group members as relatively incompetent and less worthy
of trust (Putnam 2007). While excessive trust in others can be epistemically problematic (Langfred 2004),
mutual distrust between group members can also prove detrimental to the collective performance (Ashleigh
and Nandhakumar 2007). Similarly, given conformity’s positive inuence on group cohesion, a reduction in
conformity can also harm the collective. Indeed, disagreements in heterogeneous groups can lead to group
polarization along sub-group aliations (Abrams et al. 1990), resulting in solidarity within sub-groups and
strife between them. These considerations make it dicult to assess the internal validity and robustness of
experiments reporting benets of demographic diversity that are not mediated by cognitive diversity.
By oering a precise way of testing the implications of dierent proposed causal dependencies, simulation
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methods provide a promising way forward that can complement human experiments. In simulation experi-
ments, large sample sizes can be attained at minimal cost, and experimenters enjoy a state of near omniscience
regarding the circumstances of the experiment (e.g., ensuring that there are no hidden cognitive dierences
between diverse and homogeneous groups). Moreover, in simulation experiments relevant modifying factors
can be easily and precisely manipulated, thereby allowing the robustness of results across various conditions to
be explored. Of course, simulation experiments also possess a major disadvantage in not having actual humans
as their subjects, which requires reliance on simplied and idealized assumptions about cognitive processing
and social interaction. Inferences from results of simulation experiments to human social behavior are thus on
rmer ground when they reproduce results of human experiments. This is so not only for general eects (e.g.,
reducing referent informational conformity can improve group performance), but also for the impact of eect
modiers (e.g., the eect is larger when the proportions of demographic groups are closer to parity). Accord-
ingly, we take such agreements to reinforce the results of human experiments. Conversely, a divergence of
results between simulations and human experiments indicates a problem of the sort noted by Duhem (1954):
it is an indication that an error is present, although it is unclear precisely where.
The simulation results described below are presented in this spirit of the complementary relationship be-
tween human experiments and formal models.
3 Simulation Setup
The model developed here builds on the models discussed in Zollman (2010b, see also Zollman 2007), extending
them to include factors such as group aliation, trust and conformity. This section provides a general overview
of the models.
3.1 Two-armed bandit
In our model, agents are faced with a two-armed bandit problem (Berry and Fristedt 1985); each agent is
attempting to discover the better of two available options by sequentially choosing an option, experiment-
ing with it and observing the result. While agents are unaware of the objective payo of each option, they
nonetheless have subjective estimates that inform their choice. Each experimentation involves n trials, whose
results are represented by a random draw from a binomial distribution with parameters corresponding to the
chosen option’s intrinsic payo and n. The agents are thus active inquirers whose choice of which option to
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pursue shapes their subsequent observations; if they don’t pursue an option, they won’t learn anything new
about it. Unless, that is, they receive that information from their neighbours.
3.2 Social networks
An agent’s neighbours are those with whom the agent has direct social ties. The social interaction among
agents is represented using graphical networks, where each agent is depicted as a node in the graph and
communicative pathways between agents are represented by undirected edges between the nodes. Figure 1
shows three typical network topologies that will be of interest to us. Whereas in a complete, fully connected
network every agent is in direct communication with every other, in a cycle or ring network connections are
sparser and each agent is only connected to two neighbours. Despite this dierence, in both complete and
cycle networks, all agents have an equal number of neighbours. Not so for the wheel graph. Here one agent is

































Figure 1: Dierent network topologies representing dierent types of social interactions.
Two points are worth emphasizing: First, thanks to their social ties, agents may get to “virtually" explore
options they themselves did not choose to pursue. But, such social learning also opens up the possibility of
being misled by others’ results. Second, we can use dierent network properties to represent dierent aspects
of group behavior. For instance, some aspects of inter-group dynamics can be captured by modulating the
connection weights between nodes.
3.3 Learning
Having gathered new information through observation and testimony, agents revise their estimates by
Bayesian updating. We represent agents’ beliefs in terms of continuous random variables with Beta distri-
butions, which are specied by two parameters,  and  , with a mean, , that can be calculated as + . The
Beta distribution is the conjugate prior of the Binomial distribution, which is the type of distribution from
which our agents’ observations are drawn, rendering the distribution amenable to ecient Bayesian updating
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(Sutton and Barto 1998). Specically, if the agent’s prior is given by Beta(, ) and after n trials, the agent
observes that an option was successful s times (according to the evidence gathered by individuals as well as
by their neighbors), the agent’s posterior is given by Beta( + s,  + n − s) with a mean centred on +s++n .
3.4 Decision rule
In experiments that follow, we restrict our investigation to agents who are greedy in their choice behavior,
always selecting the option with the highest expected utility. The only source of exploration for agents, there-
fore, is the information they receive from neighbours that followed an alternative option. In the simplest case,
the only determinant of an option’s utility is that option’s estimated payo. To be sure, in real life this way of
conducting oneself is reckless; choice behavior is shaped by considerations about a host of issues other than
the perceived “ecacy” of actions. To varying extent and depending on the context, our public conducts also
reect norms of etiquette, concerns about the approval and disapproval of others, and so on (Bicchieri 2017;
Turner 1991). Such factors become especially important in Section 5 when we look into choice behavior of
agents with a sense of belonging to groups with reward and punishment powers.
4 Simulation 1: Diversity and Mutual Distrust
The rst simulation examines what happens when diversity induces mutual distrust between individuals with
dierent group aliations. Recall that some level of mutual distrust is hypothesized to be benecial because
it reduces the conformity pressure due to referent informational inuences, enabling individuals to deal more
critically with social information. In this way, diversity is supposed to be advantageous to group performance,
even in the absence of any association with cognitive diversity.
4.1 Design
Agents in this simulation act on the basis of the simple decision rule discussed in section 3.4; in choosing
which option to experiment with, their behavior is fully determined by their beliefs about the payos of the
two options.1
1Each experiment consists of n = 1000 trials. The outcome of each agent’s experimentation is drawn from the Binomial distribution
representing the intrinsic payo of the method chosen by the agent.
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Representing diversity’s impact on referent informational inuences
Individuals are most impacted by informational social inuences during social learning as they integrate infor-
mation from various sources in the context of challenging tasks. As a result, informational inuences typically
result in belief change and internalizing the group’s perspective (Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Kelman 1958). In
the case of referent informational inuences, agents give more weight to the testimony of in-groups, possibly
because they perceive socially similar others to be more competent and reliable than out-groups (Turner 1982;
Turner, Wetherell, and Hogg 1989).
To represent the impact of diversity, agents in the network are divided into two groups, the proportions of
which can be varied. To control for the eect of interaction between group membership and beliefs, agents are
randomly assigned prior beliefs about the value of the two alternatives.2 Agents in each group apply a “trust
factor" w between 0 and 1 to data received from members of the other group. So, w = 1 means complete trust
between groups, w = 0 complete distrust, and 0 < w < 1 an intermediate state of distrust. Notice, rst, that
any w < 1 is unjustied distrust of out-group relative to in-group others inasmuch as group membership is
irrelevant to an agent’s competence to produce accurate results in the model. Second, given that more weight
is given to evidence from in-group neighbours, agents are more likely to reconsider their positions in response
to evidence from in-groups.
Dependent measures
Probability of success. Success was dened at the network level and under a time constraint: a population
of agents is deemed successful just when it reaches a correct, unanimous consensus after a xed number of ex-
periments. The probability of successful learning is the proportion of simulation runs in which the population
is successful in this sense.3 We examined how the probability of successful learning varied according to the
2 and  for each belief were randomly drawn from the range of [1, 4]. As discussed in section 3.3 the small values of  and 
results in high variance, meaning that agents lack condence in their prior beliefs. This is precisely the situation where informational
inuences are most eective (Hogg and Abrams 1988)
3Option B had a higher intrinsic payo (0.501) than option A (0.5). So the network was successful if every agent estimated pB to
be greater than pA after a xed number of experiments. The simulation was iterated for 10,000 runs, each involving 3,000 experiments,
each consisting of 1000 tries with the chosen option. We follow Zollman (2007, 2010b) in choosing the number of trials and experiments.
These numbers provide the accumulation of sucient evidence whereby homogeneous groups with dierent structures can reach their
full potential; further experimentation would not enhance the performance of such groups. These numbers, and assessing performance
under the time constraint represented by them, are important for our purposes because they provide a meaningful baseline for assessing
how interventions on the composition of homogeneous groups to increase diversity would impact their performance. For example,
using such a performance measure allows us to evaluate the worry, discussed in Section 2, that a lack of trust between group members
undermines group cohesion and hinders identity diverse groups from achieving their full performance potential that, absent lack of
trust, would have been possible given the cognitive repertoires of their members. That said, we also examine the interaction between
the impact of distrust and time constraints, specically in the context of discussing Figure 3b. However, we advise the reader to be
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level of group-based trust, represented by the parameter w . We explored this relationship for dierent group
sizes, dierent proportions of the two group, dierent network structures (e.g., the cycle, the wheel, and the
complete graph), as well as for dierent time constraints.
4.2 Results
Group-based trust in complete networks
Figure 2 shows the impact of varying the amount of trust towards out-group individuals on the reliability
of the collective performance. As shown in Figure 2a, regardless of their size, networks with high levels of
inter-group distrust (w = 0.005) were the worst collective performers. Interestingly, however, the second
worst collectives were networks wherein individuals placed complete trust in their neighbours, regardless of
their group aliation (w = 1). Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 2b, group-based distrust has more positive
eects when group proportions are closer to parity. This nding coincides with the empirical nding that
eects of increased diversity are more positive when groups are more evenly balanced than when one group
is numerically predominant (Bear and Woolley 2011; Reagans and Zuckerman 2001).
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Figure 2: Impact of group-based trust, w , on collective performance in complete networks. (a) shows how performance in groups of dierent size varies
as a function of group-based trust. In each case, the network is composed of agents from two equally represented groups. (b) shows how performance
changes as a result of varying the group composition in complete networks of size 10 (1-9 indicates that the network included 1 out-group member).
Group-based trust and network structure
The potential benets of identity-induced distrust with respect to the reliability of collective performance
varies from one network structure to another. In particular, the type of mutual distrust induced by diversity
mindful of the limitations of the model, discussed in Section 6, when interpreting the longer term performance.
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is most benecial in highly connected networks such as the complete graph. For other graph structures, the
eect of distrust on performance is marginal before becoming highly negative at lower levels of w (see Figure
3a). Reliable convergence to truth is only one aspect of eective performance, however. It also matters how
quickly groups arrive at a consensus. Viewed from this perspective, group-based distrust is particularly inimical
to sparser networks such as the cycle (Figure 3b).4 In complete networks, in comparison, intermediate levels of
distrust produce performance gains while maintaining, to a large extent, the speed of convergence – a feature
that makes networks with high levels of connectivity attractive in many circumstances.5



























































Figure 3: Inuence of group-based trust,w , on the performance of networks of 10 agents with varying graphical structures. (a) shows the impact of trust
on the performance of cycle, complete, and wheel networks. (b) shows the impact of trust on performance as a function of time constraints–between
10 to 5,000 rounds of experiments after which performance is probed. The gure thus depicts the inuence of trust on the speed of reaching a correct
consensus in complete and cycle structures.
4.3 Discussion
Simulation 1 supports the view that demographic diversity can improve group performance by reducing the
excessive trust individuals place in others.6 The fact that this reduction of trust is most benecial in highly con-
nected networks is telling: information travels quickly and widely across highly connected networks. But so
does misinformation. So, the misleading result of any one agent can spread quickly across the network, poten-
4In some networks the same group composition (e.g., a 50-50 composition) can be instantiated in dierent patterns; in a cycle
network, for example, the members of the two sub-groups may be interspersed throughout the network or each sub-group may form
a cluster. With respect to the general trends shown here, the placement did not make much of a dierence.
5This is not true of high levels of distrust. In complete networks of size 10 and parity of representation, the performance of groups
withw = 0.001 remains inferior to groups with fully trusting individuals even after 20,000 experiments. In contrast, as shown in Figure
3b, it takes less than 200 experiments for similar networks but with w = 0.1 to surpass the reliability of fully trusting networks.
6In dicult learning tasks, such as the one studied here, uniform w = 1 is excessive in the sense that there exist a lower value of w
that, were it adopted by all individuals, would result in better group performance. The group optimal w depends on various contextual
factors, including task diculty and network structure. While in simulations such as ours, the group optimal w can be approximated
using various search strategies, the problem can quickly become intractable in real-world settings.
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tially derailing the epistemic pursuit of all the neighbours. This is precisely why sparser networks such as the
cycle and the wheel outperform the complete graph; because of their sparsity, such networks quarantine mis-
leading results, protecting agents from frequently changing their minds in light of such results. Nonetheless,
given the longer time it takes for information to travel across sparser networks, their superior performance
comes at the cost of slower convergence to a solution (Zollman 2007, 2010b). Indeed, if what we value is swift
convergence to a solution, distrust is particularly harmful to sparser networks.7
Angere and Olsson (2017) show that group performance in complete networks improves if individuals
agree to only share novel, high-quality evidence. Zollman (2010b) achieves similar results with “highly con-
dent" agents8, whose beliefs are not easily changed. By slowing down the speed of convergence to consensus,
however, this reduced sensitivity to misinformation comes at a cost. Our simulation shows that similar benets
and trade-os can arise when individuals exhibit dierential processing of social information. By reducing the
weight assigned to information arriving from a subset of social sources, specically those seen as dissimilar,
diversity protects individuals from hastily revising their views in response to social information in ambiguous
decision environments.
5 Simulation 2: Diversity and Normative Conformity
Even when individuals manage to remain unswayed by the majority’s opinion, they may still refrain from
acting in nonconformist ways as a result of normative group inuences. The second simulation evaluates the
hypothesis that diversity can be benecial to group performance by reducing the cost of expressing dissenting
views.
5.1 Design
The behavior of agents in the previous simulation was a pure reection of beliefs that were shaped, in part, by
informational group inuences. Normative group inuences, in contrast, put pressure on individuals’ decision
making: individuals are now sensitive to the approval and disapproval of the group, and public conduct is no
longer a perfect indicator of private acceptance (Kelley 1952). As discussed in section 3.4, taking such inuences
into account requires modifying agents’ decision rules.
7For example, while not shown in Figure 3b, the performance of cycle networks of w = 1 and w = 0.1 remains unchanged even
when probed after 10,000 and 20,000 number of experiments. This means, at least in the type of setting considered here, distrust only
slows such groups from achieving their full performance potential without resulting in tangible performance benets later.
8That is, agents whose beliefs are characterized by high  and  values
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Representing diversity’s impact on normative group inuences
There is an extensive psychological literature seeking to mathematically represent the impact of conformity as
a function of factors such as majority size (for a review see Bond 2005). Here, we employ the so-called “Other-
Total Ratio", which has been especially useful for capturing conformity pressure due to normative inuences
(Mullen 1983; Stasser and Davis 1981).9
Suppose agent i is part of a community of size i , consisting of i’s direct neighbours as well as i itself. If
in the previous round  Ai of the community publicly pursued option A, we can think of the pressure on i to




: there is minimum incentive to follow the option that wasn’t
pursued by anyone and maximum incentive to choose the option chosen by all. The overall utility of pursuing
A for agent i is now a function of i’s belief about A’s chance of success, pAi , as well as the social incentive of
doing so:
ui(A) = (1 − ) × pAi +  ×
 Ai
i
Where  represents agent i’s conformist tendency. When  = 0, agents act on the basis of their personal beliefs,
paying no heed to what others are doing or what is normatively expected of a member of the community. In
contrast, when  = 1, truth no longer matters; what agents do is a matter of a popularity contest in their
group.10 In the simulations that follow, we assume that all agents have the same conformist tendency.
However, previous applications of the “Other-Total Ratio" have been to homogeneous groups. Some adap-
tation, then, is required to apply the measure to heterogeneous groups, as we do here. Our approach is to
assume, rst, that individuals are only concerned to conform with members of their own groups, and second
that the presence of out-group individuals, regardless of what views they express, tends to dilute pressure
to conform. Regarding the rst of these points, the opinions of in-groups are known to have greater impact
when it comes to normative social inuences deriving from group belonging concerns (Levine et al. 2002;
Turner 1982). Likewise, individuals tend to direct their normative expectations to other in-groups (Antonio et
9Among formal models of conformity in philosophy, Mohseni and Williams (2019) use a similar majority ratio. There is, however,
no psychological equivalent to the representation of conformity impact used in Zollman (2010a) and Weatherall and O’Connor (2018).
These models represent conformity pressure with regards to a given option in terms of the number of individuals endorsing that
option. As the psychological literature has shown, however, conformity pressure is not a linear function of the majority size. The
impact of informational and normative group inuences seems to plateau when the majority size is higher than a certain threshold
(Bond 2005).
10Notice that whether a given value of  is strong enough to lead to conformist behaviors depends not only on the majority strength
but also on the dierence in objective payos; intuitively, the potential pain of nonconformist behavior is not worth the gain, if the
agent can only expect negligible benets. In this simulation, the objective payo was 0.5 for option A and 0.51 for option B.
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al. 2004; Phillips 2003). Regarding the second point, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the presence of
out-group individuals has a capacity to reduce conformity that is not tied to what views they express (Gaither
et al. 2018). As Phillips et al. put it, “the mere presence of social diversity in task groups, even when out-group
members are not bringing minority viewpoints to the table, can fundamentally change the behavior of the
social majority to enhance group performance" (Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale 2009). Reduction of pressure
to conform to one’s identity group is one mechanism through which this enhanced performance can occur, for
example, because people tend to experience greater irritation when dissenting views are expressed by in-group
rather than out-group individuals (Phillips and Loyd 2006). Thus, in a socially diverse group, a person might
expect to provoke less annoyance in others when expressing dissenting views and therefore be less inhibited
in doing so.
To reect the research results sketched above, we restrict  Ai to in-group individuals in agent i’s commu-
nity, while still interpreting i as the total size of the community, which includes all neighbours regardless of
group aliations;11 individuals may thus encounter the greatest social pressure in completely homogeneous
groups. As the group gets diversied, the maximum possible pressure is reduced to the ratio of in-group com-
munity members to total community, reecting the idea that the mere presence of out-group individuals makes
people more willing to express dissenting views. Hence, in our modication of the “Other-Total Ratio," only
the expressed opinions of in-group members generate normative conformity pressures, but those pressures
can be mitigated by the presence of out-group individuals. Note that our measure of conformity pressure does
not attempt to capture all of the eects found in the Phillips et al. experiment (Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale
2009) discussed in Section 2. For example, we do not attempt to model the eect whereby unexpectedly taking
sides with an outsider against one’s own group causes anxiety about damaging in-group relationships and
thereby prompts closer attention to relevant arguments and evidence. Such omissions make our measure con-
servative in the sense of being likely to underestimate the positive eects of demographic diversity associated
with counteracting normative conformity.
Dependent measures
Compliance, acceptance, and polarization. The dissociation between private acceptance and public com-
pliance introduces four possible end results (cf. Weatherall and O’Connor 2018): correct consensus indicates
11Of course, the inuence of others need not be all or nothing. For example, we may allow out-groups to exert some inuence,
just less than in-groups. Similarly, we can modify how individuals react to out-group members, e.g., when one group is more socially
powerful.
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that every agent not only publicly pursues the correct option, but also truly believes in its superiority. Correct
but with disagreement refers to the situation where the collective publicly converges on the correct option,
but some agents do so because of social pressure and against their innermost beliefs. Similar denitions apply
to incorrect consensus and incorrect but with disagreement. In addition, our new set-up turns polarization into
a possibility.
Probability of success. Given the dissociation between private beliefs and public conduct, here we
examined how the probability of successful conduct, consisting of “correct all” and “correct but” portions of
results, varied according to the level of conformist tendency in groups of dierent composition.12
5.2 Results
Conformity and group composition
Overall, and regardless of group composition, performance was negatively aected by conformism (see Figure
4a).13 At low levels of , the presence of out-group agents resulted in improved performance. With increased
conformity, there was a qualitative shift in this trend, and homogenous groups outperformed heterogenous
collectives.
12Insofar as normative inuences are driven by observing in-group behavior, in this set of simulations there is no conformity
pressure on agents in the rst round of experimentation. Normative inuences impact choice behavior only after agents observe
in-group neighbors’ conducts. We keep the number of experiments and trials the same. Combined with a dierence of 0.1 between
the payo of two options (see Footnote 9), this reects the setting of empirical studies of normative inuence where the inuence of
conformity pressure on conduct tends to be evaluated in the context of easy tasks.
13We do not present the result from groups with 2-8 and 4-6 composition. This is because by making equal votes for the two options
possible (e.g., 2-2 and 3-3 in the 4-6 groups) the composition of such groups allows for another way of reducing conformity pressure
that does not work via the diversity pathway. While the same could be said of the homogeneous group, we simply accept that case
as our baseline. Our results might thus be more conservative in the sense of underestimating the detrimental impact of conformity in
homogeneous groups.
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Figure 4: Inuence of conformity on successful conduct in dierent complete networks of 10 agents. (a) shows how performance varies in networks with
dierent proportions of the two groups, and (b) shows a breakdown of the simulation outcomes in terms of the interaction between public consensus,
private acceptance, and polarization. Each bar represents a particular value of kappa: a:  = 0, b:  = 0.00625, c:  = 0.0125, d:  = 0.025, e:  = 0.05, f:
 = 0.1
5.3 Discussion
Previous simulation studies have found that increased conformity negatively impacts group performance
(Weatherall and O’Connor 2018). Simulation 2 shows that the same pattern holds, when agents in the net-
work identify with dierent groups. Consider, then, the hypothesis that demographic diversity can counteract
normative conformity and thereby lessen its negative eects. Our results support this hypothesis, albeit only
for low values of . This can be seen in Figure 4a, wherein the homogeneous group (i.e., 0-10) performs worse
than demographically mixed groups when  is small but greater than zero.14 The reasons for the diversity-
induced improvements are twofold. First, by reducing the conformity pressure on in-group individuals, the
introduction of out-group members promotes contestation. As shown in Figure 4b, for a signicant portion
of runs where homogeneous groups converged on the wrong option, the group included some agents that
privately disagreed with the public consensus (“incorrect but" in the graph). Because of conformity pressures,
however, these agents did not act in accordance with their personal beliefs, and so their dissenting opinions
remained private. With smaller values of , the presence of out-group individuals reduced the conformity
pressure on dissenting agents, enabling them to pursue the option they believed best.15 These publicly observ-
able dierences in the option pursued in turn shape the normative inuences on neighbors in the subsequent
14Note that the presence of just one out-group individual is sucient to achieve this eect, a result that corresponds to ndings in
some human experiments (Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale 2009).
15Though sometimes not reected in the visualization, the “correct but” and “incorrect but” cases do not completely disappear after
the introduction of out-groups.
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round. As a result, when the group reaches a consensus, it is one that likely reects agents’ private opinions.
As  grows, however, agents are less likely to deviate from the majority position. Indeed, any benet from the
presence of out-groups is overwhelmed by between-group polarization.
Second, the introduction of out-groups also promotes exploration. The agents in our simulations are
greedy, always following the option with the higher estimated value. Exploration is possible in this set-up
thanks to observing the result of others. In eect, each agent gets to vicariously explore because the commu-
nity allows the agents to be greedy. By penalizing agents for pursuing less popular options that they nonethe-
less consider superior, conformity also prevents this mechanism of vicarious exploration. The opportunity to
explore via others is restored to some extent by the addition of out-group agents. In this case, even agents
whose beliefs were in alignment with the group behavior (i.e., that were not dissenting) may change their
belief in light of the new evidence regarding less explored options.
6 General Discussion
Can diversity benet group performance in ways that are not mediated by task-relevant attributes of individual
members? Going against the commonly presumed perspective, the results of our simulations demonstrate that,
under certain conditions, it can. In particular, our ndings support the claim that diversity can benet group
performance by counteracting informational and normative group inuences that may negatively impact the
epistemic endeavours of homogeneous groups (Levine et al. 2014; Phillips 2017). Having discussed the ndings
separately in previous sections (4.3 and 5.3), here we take a closer look at general limitations of our model and
consider broader implications of our approach for simulation-based approaches to studying diversity.
Limitations of the model
Our models are limited in a number of ways. First, they abstract away from and make a number of simplifying
assumptions about various factors that can modulate informational and normative group inuences in impor-
tant ways. For example, the agents are assumed to be indistinguishable in terms of their group-based trust and
conformist tendencies. This is, of course, a simplifying idealization. In general, it matters who says what to
whom. Yet, the models abstract away from considerations such as status, centrality, and (perceived) expertise
even though these factors are important modiers of informational and normative group inuences (Gilovich
et al. 2018; Raven 2008).
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Even when certain variables are explicitly represented within the model, the mechanisms relating them are
highly simplied or even ignored. For instance, we are assuming that there is no relation between group-based
trust and the composition of the collective. In many real-world contexts, however, this is clearly an implausible
assumption, because high levels of group-based distrust may cause minority individuals to leave, making the
collective more homogeneous. Similarly, high conformity pressure on the majority group may be caused by
factors that also force minority individuals to “assimilate” to “t in", thereby changing the overall dynamics.
More generally, in natural settings, such variables are often related to one another by some mechanism (e.g., a
common cause) such that variations in one are associated with variations in others. It is important to be clear
about these limitations in interpreting our ndings. For example, since mechanisms (e.g., asymmetric power
relations) that may potentially connect mutual distrust, group composition, and individual performance are not
represented in our model, the ndings should not be taken as suggesting that a manager, who is interested in
improving her team’s performance, should instigate distrust among employees from dierent demographics.16
One could imagine dierent ways of relaxing some of these assumptions. We may, for instance, let agents
dier with respect to status, perhaps as a function of their centrality in the graph, in a way that impacts their
interactions with others. For our purposes, however, the assumptions help focus the experiment on the core
hypothesis under investigation that, even when unrelated to cognitive diversity, demographic diversity can
benet group performance by counteracting detrimental pressures to conform. Moreover, there are interesting
realistic scenarios where the most prominent factor driving behavior is indeed group aliation; these include
settings in which all group members interact with one another, for a relatively short time period, and where
salient identities have limited connection to task-related expertise or ability. Importantly for our purposes,
these are precisely the type of settings often used in human experiments investigating the inuence of diversity
on conformity and group performance (Gaither et al. 2018; Levine et al. 2014; Phillips, Liljenquist, and Neale
2009). Our simulation experiments, then, nd that demographic diversity can improve group performance
by reducing conformity under circumstances similar to those of human experiments yielding the same result.
What is more, as discussed below, the simulations are suggestive of further background conditions that might
also moderate the inuence of diversity.
16This is true even when the manager somehow knows the context-specic group optimal level of trust (given the network struc-
ture, task diculty, ...), which is often infeasible in practice (see Footnote 6). For a discussion of some of the challenges in leveraging
these benets of demographic diversity in practice, see Muldoon 2018.
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Demographic Diversity and the Uptake of Simulation Studies
The work presented here is suggestive for simulation-based studies of diversity in two ways. First, in relation
to the point about the expressive limits of a given model, the ndings highlight the need for caution in the
interpretation, presentation and uptake of simulation results. This point can be best illustrated with respect to
Hong and Page’s agent-based model developed to support what they call the “diversity trumps ability" theorem
(2004). In this model, agents face the task of nding the maximum of a function, which can be visualized as
nding the peak of a circular landscape. Each agent is uniquely represented by a set of heuristics that enables
the agent to check dierent positions ahead of its current location on the landscape. Individual problem solving
consists in the ordered application of heuristics. The agent halts when it can nd no further improvements.
Each agent’s ability or performance is measured in terms of the expected value of its end points, given all
possible starting positions. In the serial version of the task, collective problem solving is represented in terms
of agents interacting sequentially: The rst agent begins at a randomly assigned position on the circle and
applies its heuristics until it can nd no further improvement. The next agent begins where the previous
agent left o and applies its own heuristics. This process cycles through the team members until no further
improvements can be found. Within this set up, Hong and Page nd that under certain conditions, “a team
of randomly selected agents outperforms a team comprised of the best-performing agents". Assuming that
randomly selected teams are likely to be more diverse in terms of their heuristics, cognitive diversity can thus
be seen as improving group performance.
Importantly, Hong and Page are circumspect about the interpretation of their results as demonstrating the
benecial eect of demographic diversity on group performance. This caution is completely reasonable. Hong
and Page’s model answers the counterfactual question, “what would happen if, all else equal, we made the
teams cognitively more diverse?” But, insofar as demographic diversity is not at all represented in the model,
it makes little sense to transport the model’s answer to that question to the new question, “what would happen
if we made the teams demographically more diverse?" This means, however, that such models cannot support
the claim that demographic diversity cannot benet group performance, independently of cognitive diversity.
Unfortunately, this is precisely what Page (2017) appears to be asserting in the following passage.
For cognitive diversity to produce a bonus, it must be germane to the task. That same logic applies
to identity diversity. For women, by virtue of being women, to create immediate diversity bonuses,
women’s repertoires ... would have to produce more accurate predictions, more creative ideas,
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better solutions to problems, or more comprehensive evaluations of projects. (2017, 169).
This claim assumes that, when it comes to communication dynamics, demographic diversity can only lead
to “more conict, more problems with communication, and less mutual respect and trust among members”
(Hong and Page 2004, 16385-16386). So, one can can study demographic diversity’s positive impacts by focus-
ing on its correlation with cognitive diversity, and abstracting away from its other consequences, much like
the way one studies mechanics assuming friction-less planes or electrical networks assuming negligible wire
resistance—factors that in any case only hinder velocity or current. The problem with this inference is that it
is based on a model that is not rich enough for actually exploring the complex dynamics instigated by these
inter-group frictions. For, instead of simply hindering performance, these frictions could enhance performance
by productively unsettling detrimental interaction dynamics.
The achievement of any task by a group requires eliciting, examining, and integrating the knowledge
possessed by individual group members. These interactions are subject to a host of group inuences that could
perturb the collective’s epistemic performance. As suggested by the empirical hypotheses discussed in Section
2 and demonstrated by our simulations, it is precisely by explicitly incorporating these types of epistemic
interactions into our model that we can get a fuller assessment of the dependencies between demographic
diversity and group performance. In Hong and Page’s model, on the other hand, group interaction merely
involves one agent’s resumption of the collective task after another agent has been incapable of furthering this
task. Group inuences such as conformity pressure are thus not represented in the model.
What makes the situation unfortunate is not so much the restricted understanding aorded by Hong and
Page’s model. That is a feature of most, if not all, simulation-based (and indeed experimental) approaches,
including our own. The more serious concern is the frequent use of Hong and Page’s results to identify the
core rationale for making a “business case" for demographic diversity. Aside from the ethical question of
whether demographic diversity should require a business case, it is crucial that such discussions consider the
consequences of demographic diversity for group interaction. By explicitly incorporating these considerations,
our results oer a further rationale for the epistemic benets of demographic diversity: diversity can benet
group performance because it promotes mechanisms that support critical and contestable collective inquiry—
desirable properties that can be lost even in cognitively diverse but demographically homogeneous groups.
This rationale is arguably more fundamental than the one based on cognitive diversity, because the quality
of group performance ultimately depends on the interaction dynamics of information sharing and processing
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(cf. Anderson 2006; Medina 2013); dierences that could be cognitively benecial remain inert, if not actively
pursued and voiced.
Empirically Sensitive Robustness in Simulation Studies
A second suggestion for simulation-based research on diversity has to do with the manner in which robustness
is pursued. In practice, the process of modeling involves constructing rather idiosyncratic representations of
the target system. Modelers abstract away from certain aspects of the target system and make a variety of
simplifying assumptions about certain other aspects (Weisberg 2007; Woodward 2006). Perhaps inadvertently,
they may even neglect important features of the system of interest. When a feature of the phenomenon is
selected, one needs to make value judgments about its appropriate formalization. What is more, in studying
the target thus represented, modelers investigate what is often only a small subset of the possible parameter
space.
Still, one hopes that these idiosyncrasies do not undermine the intended purpose of the model and that the
patterns of interest generated by the model would arise even if the target was represented in some other, equally
plausible way. Accordingly, one may wish to test the robustness of the generated patterns under changes to
the model: would we observe the same kind of patterns, had we explored other regions of the parameter
space, or altered some choices of formalization or relaxed some of the idealizing assumptions? Understandably,
therefore, many simulation-based works on diversity and epistemic division of labour are robustness studies
(e.g., Grim et al. 2019; Rosenstock, Bruner, and O’Connor 2017; Thoma 2015). Such works delineate the range
of parameter settings and assumptions wherein some modeling results holds, and so help guard against illicit
inferences. Moreover, they further our understanding by highlighting novel ways of representing the target.
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that robustness should be sought as a means of testing whether
the particular way in which the target is represented threatens the model’s intended aim. Suppose, for example,
that a model seeks to provide insight regarding a class of real world systems. In that case, what matters is not
that the ndings are robust per se, but that they are robust in an empirically sensitive way: the model should
yield the patterns of interest precisely under those conditions where one expects similar types of eects in the
real-world target system. Given the context-sensitivity of the vast majority of eects in complex systems, it
would be highly surprising if a model of one such system generated patterns that were robust across the board,
regardless of the particular context and parameter setting. As a concrete example, consider Zollman’s (2010b)
model. The model suggests that, under certain conditions, sparser networks are conducive to better epistemic
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performance. Insofar as sparsity of connections induces a diversity of information, we may interpret the
result as suggesting that under the conditions identied cognitive diversity is benecial to group performance.
Nonetheless, as Rosenstock et al. (2017) rightly note, Zollman’s ndings hold only in limited situations where
the task facing the collective is dicult17. Sparsity, and so diversity, is no longer benecial once we explore
the regions of the parameter space corresponding to easier tasks.
From a conceptual point of view, however, this lack of robustness is not surprising. Presumably, what makes
the diversity of cognitive repertoires benecial is its contribution to eective exploration of novel alternatives
in uncertain and complex task environments. When the answer is obvious (e.g., due to problem simplicity or
learned expertise), no exploration is needed and so one should expect the epistemic benets of diversity to be
minimal. Crucially, this is precisely what one nds in empirical research on diversity. In their meta-analysis
of empirical literature, for instance, van Dijk et al. (2012) nd that the benets of cognitive diversity are
moderated by task complexity and are most pronounced in tasks requiring innovation. Given these conceptual
and empirical considerations, we should in fact be suspicious of the empirical plausibility of models according
to which cognitive diversity remains benecial even in easy and routine tasks.
Seeking empirically sensitive robustness results in a natural complementarity between simulations and
human experiments. In the context of the current work, the simulations identify certain eects that one would
expect given the empirical literature. In our rst simulation, for instance, the benets of demographic diver-
sity is most pronounced when the two groups are evenly balanced, a nding that is in line with empirical
results (Bear and Woolley 2011; Joshi and Roh 2009). However, this correspondence is not exact, as the em-
pirical research just cited tends to nd negative eects when, for instance, a small proportion of women are
introduced into a predominantly male eld. This may reect the fact noted above that our model does not
represent all mechanisms whereby increased distrust may adversely impact group performance. Moreover,
we also identify certain eect modiers that, to our knowledge, have not been investigated in empirical set-
tings. For example, in our rst simulation experiment, demographic diversity made the group more likely to
converge on the correct result only in the complete network – a situation approximated in empirical studies
when every individual is in contact with every other, either in face-to-face meetings or online. This result
suggests that, at least insofar as the referent informational paths are concerned, demographic diversity may
be less benecial in situations where all do not communicate with all. And our second experiment found that
17The problem is dicult when the dierence in the objective payos of dierent options is small, the amount of information
sampled in each experiment is relatively small, or when the population size is small.
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demographic diversity lessened adverse eects of normative conformity only when the preference for confor-
mity was relatively slight, suggesting that demographic diversity is more likely to lead to polarization when
there are strong within-group pressures to conform. Thus, our simulations suggest hypotheses that could be
tested by experiments involving human subjects and online communities.
There have been recent calls to bring agent-based models of social epistemology in closer contact with em-
pirical evidence (Frey and Šešelja 2019, 2018; Harnagel 2019; Martini and Pinto 2017; Steel et al. 2019; Thicke
2020). For example, Thicke (2020) proposes that models be evaluated on the basis of their representational and
predictive accuracy: assumptions in models should be plausible idealizations of the phenomena and predictions
derived from the model should match observations. The approach followed in this paper can be interpreted
as attempting to attain these criteria but with the twist that the phenomena are primarily derived from exper-
iments involving human subjects. One advantage of this approach is that human experiments are simplied
social interactions whose rules and results are better known and are thus more amenable to modeling than
messy real-world social life. Moreover, our approach also takes advantage of the complementary strengths
and weaknesses of simulation and human experiments. In this way, it suggests a potential aim for simulation
experiments that falls between providing “how possibly explanations" and predicting real-life social dynamics
in their full complexity. This alternative aim consists of establishing, in conjunction with research involving
human subjects, the existence of an experimental phenomenon, for instance, that demographic diversity can
improve group performance by counteracting referent informational conformity. Since both simulation and
human experiments are a step removed from the social reality that is ultimately of interest, a gap would still
remain between an experimental phenomenon and policy recommendations. Our approach, therefore, could
be seen as an example of what Harnagel calls “mid-level modeling," wherein empirically calibrated models
linked to controlled experiments mediate between theory and real-life phenomena (Harnagel 2019).
Philosophers have developed valuable simulation models for investigating group behavior in a variety of
epistemic tasks (see Šešelja, Straußer, and Borg 2020). These models can be usefully modied to address is-
sues of societal concern regarding the impact of demographic diversity. As diversity researchers investigate
the impact of diversity in broader settings and in online communities, we believe that such a philosophical en-
gagement will be mutually benecial to both empirical and simulation studies of the topic. The work presented
here takes a step towards facilitating this complementary and multi-disciplinary orientation.
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